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ROOT CANAL OF THE PROBLEM: THE 
IOWA SUPREME COURT’S PROTECTION 
OF MALE IMPULSES OVER  
FEMALE TRAITS 
CATHERINE E. MENDOLA* 
Abstract: In 2010, Dr. James H. Knight DDS fired his employee, Melissa Nel-
son, explaining that his wife had become jealous of their consensual but nonsex-
ual relationship. Nelson, in turn, filed a sex discrimination claim, alleging that 
her termination would not have occurred, but-for her sex. The Iowa Supreme 
Court sided with Knight, ruling that Nelson’s termination was due to Knight’s 
wife’s jealousy, irrespective of Nelson’s sex. This Comment argues that: (1) in 
the absence of sexual conduct, the court’s reliance on precedent involving con-
sensual sexual relationships was misplaced; (2) in relying on the wrong prece-
dent, the court set an unnecessarily high standard for plaintiffs to meet in a sex 
discrimination case; and (3) Nelson v. James H. Knight DDS, P.C. is instead a 
mixed-motives case and should have succeeded as a sex discrimination claim. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2012, the Iowa District Court in Webster County granted summary 
judgment to defendant Dr. James H. Knight DDS in a claim of sex discrimina-
tion under Iowa Code § 216.6.1 The plaintiff, Knight’s former dental assistant, 
Melissa Nelson, filed the initial claim after Dr. Knight terminated her employ-
ment.2 Dr. Knight stated that the reason for her termination was his wife’s jeal-
ousy over their professional and personal relationship, and his worry that he 
                                                                                                                           
 * Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE JOURNAL OF LAW & SOCIAL JUSTICE 2013–2014. 
 1 IOWA CODE § 216.6 (2009); Nelson v. James H. Knight DDS, P.C., 834 N.W.2d 64, 73 (Iowa 
2013). The code reads, in pertinent part, 
It shall be an unfair or discriminatory practice for any [p]erson to . . . discharge any 
employee, or to otherwise discriminate in employment against any applicant for em-
ployment or any employee because of the age, race, creed, color, sex, sexual orienta-
tion, gender identity, national origin, religion, or disability of such applicant or employ-
ee, unless based upon the nature of the occupation. 
§ 216.6. 
 2 Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 67. Nelson claimed that her termination was a violation of Iowa law 
under IOWA CODE § 216.6, which was modeled after Title VII, passed by Congress in 1964. See 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006); Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 67. Title VII states, in pertinent part, that it is 
illegal “to discharge any individual . . . because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). 
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may try to have an affair with Nelson.3 Nelson argued that her termination 
would not have occurred, but-for her sex.4 
During the course of Nelson’s employment, Dr. Knight made numerous 
sexually-charged statements to her, coloring their relationship and demonstrat-
ing his physical attraction to her.5 After Mrs. Knight discovered text messages 
between her husband and Nelson, which included sexually suggestive com-
ments by Dr. Knight, Mrs. Knight demanded that he fire Nelson.6 Mrs. Knight 
had complained in the past about Nelson’s clothing, her coldness to Mrs. 
Knight, and her habit of staying after work with Dr. Knight, and the text mes-
sages finally caused her to request Nelson’s firing.7 While the threat that Nel-
son posed to Dr. and Mrs. Knight may not have been fueled by Nelson’s sex 
alone, it was inspired in a critical way by Nelson’s physical appearance, which 
cannot be detached from her sex.8 
On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court upheld the district court’s grant of 
summary judgment in favor of Dr. Knight, citing the plaintiff’s inability to 
support the assertion that her termination was based on her sex.9 The court 
emphasized Dr. Knight and Nelson’s consensual personal relationship, which 
was the basis for Mrs. Knight’s jealousy.10 Despite an absence of sexual con-
tact, the court cited case law dealing with consensual sexual workplace rela-
tionships.11 
Part I of this Comment discusses the factual and procedural history of 
Nelson v. James H. Knight DDS, P.C. Part II discusses the court’s analysis of 
the case and its qualifications regarding the decision, namely the admission 
that when an employer takes an adverse employment action against an em-
ployee based on a “gender-specific characteristic,” it may constitute sex dis-
                                                                                                                           
 3 Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 66. 
 4 Id. 
 5 See id. at 66–67. 
 6 Id. at 67. 
 7 Id. at 66. As Mrs. Knight explained in her affidavit and deposition, “I thought it was strange that 
after being at work all day and away from her kids and husband that she would not be anxious to get 
home like the other [women] in the office.” Id. (alteration in original). 
 8 See Barry Gillen & Richard C. Sherman, Physical Attractiveness and Sex As Determinants of 
Trait Attributions, 15 MULTIVARIATE BEHAV. RES. 423, 436–37 (1980) (psychology study examining 
physical attractiveness and gender, which concluded that physical attractiveness is a gender-specific 
trait). 
 9 Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 70, 73. 
 10 Id. at 67 n.5. 
 11 See id. at 68, 70; see also Benders v. Bellows & Bellows, 515 F.3d 757, 768 (7th Cir. 2008) 
(employee’s sex discrimination claim was inactionable under Title VII when she was terminated be-
cause of her employer’s desire to hide a past consensual relationship from his wife); Kahn v. Objec-
tive Solutions, Int’l, 86 F. Supp. 2d 377, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding consensual office affair pre-
cluded employee from having an actionable sex discrimination termination claim); Campbell v. Mas-
ten, 955 F. Supp. 526, 528 (D. Md. 1997) (denying sex discrimination when discharged employee was 
involved in an office affair that inspired jealousy). 
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crimination. Part III of this Comment criticizes the court’s failure to address 
the existence of sex discrimination within the case: because Nelson’s attrac-
tiveness inspired Mrs. Knight’s jealousy, Nelson’s gender-specific characteris-
tic impacted her termination. This Comment then asserts that the case is a 
mixed-motives case, and thus satisfies the sex discrimination standards set out 
by the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. 
I. THE IOWA SUPREME COURT IGNORES NELSON’S SEX AND 
MISCHARACTERIZES HER TERMINATION 
Dr. James H. Knight DDS hired Melissa Nelson, then twenty years old, as 
a dental assistant in his office in 1999.12 She worked for Dr. Knight for ten-
and-one-half years, alongside several other dental assistants, all of whom were 
female.13 Dr. Knight’s wife, Jeanne Knight, was also employed at the dental 
office.14 Dr. Knight believed Nelson to be a skilled dental assistant, and Nel-
son, in turn, felt that Dr. Knight was a person of high integrity who treated her 
with respect.15 Nelson viewed Dr. Knight as a “friend and father figure,” and 
denied that she ever flirted with him or sought an intimate relationship with 
him.16 Nelson did admit, however, that another coworker was jealous that Nel-
son got along with the dentist.17 
Beginning in late 2008, Dr. Knight complained to Nelson that her cloth-
ing was too tight and revealing and that it distracted him.18 Occasionally, he 
asked Nelson to wear a lab coat.19 In at least one other instance, he sent a text 
message to Nelson requesting that she wear less revealing clothing.20 Dr. 
Knight later testified that he made these requests to Nelson because he did not 
“think it’s good . . . to see her wearing things that accentuate her body.”21 Nel-
son did not feel that her clothing was inappropriate or tight.22 
During the last six months of Nelson’s employment, Dr. Knight and Nel-
son began sending text messages to each other outside of the workplace.23 The 
content of these messages was both work-related and personal.24 The texting 
                                                                                                                           
 12 Nelson v. James H. Knight DDS, P.C., 834 N.W.2d 64, 65 (Iowa 2013). 
 13 Id. at 66, 73. 
 14 Id. at 66. 
 15 Id. at 65. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. at 66. 
 21 Id. at 65. 
 22 Id. While Nelson did not feel as though her clothing was inappropriate, it was also one of the 
complaints that Mrs. Knight made about Nelson. See id. at 66. 
 23 Id. at 65. 
 24 Id. 
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was initiated by both parties and neither objected to the messages.25 Several of 
the text messages sent by Dr. Knight were inappropriate in nature.26 One mes-
sage from Dr. Knight stated that if Nelson ever saw his “pants bulging,” she 
would know that her clothing was too revealing.27 Another message from Dr. 
Knight complained of a tight shirt that Nelson wore, and then stated that it was 
good that she did not wear tight pants as well because then he “would get it 
coming and going.”28 Dr. Knight also once texted Nelson to ask how often she 
experienced an orgasm.29 Nelson did not reply.30 In response to a statement 
from Nelson regarding infrequency in her sex life, Dr. Knight replied, “[t]hat’s 
like having a Lamborghini in the garage and never driving it.”31 
In late 2009, Mrs. Knight discovered that Dr. Knight and Nelson had been 
sending each other text messages.32 Mrs. Knight confronted Dr. Knight and 
demanded that he fire Nelson because she “was a big threat to [their] mar-
riage.”33 The Knights consulted with the senior pastor of their church, who 
agreed with the decision to end Nelson’s employment.34 On January 4, 2010, 
Dr. Knight fired Nelson by reading from a prepared statement, which stated 
that their relationship had become detrimental to his family and that it was in 
the best interest of each of their families that they no longer work together.35 
Soon after, Nelson’s husband met with Dr. Knight and the pastor to discuss the 
termination.36 Dr. Knight explained that Nelson did nothing inappropriate, but 
that he felt he was getting too personally attached to her and feared that he 
would try to have an affair with her someday if she continued working there.37 
After being granted the right to sue by the Iowa Civil Rights Commission, 
Melissa Nelson sued Dr. Knight for a violation of Iowa Code § 216.6(1)(a), 
alleging that he discriminated against her on the basis of sex, but notably not 
alleging sexual harassment.38 Nelson asserted that Dr. Knight terminated her 
                                                                                                                           
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. at 65–66. 
 27 Id. at 65. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. at 66. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. Dr. Knight’s pastor was present for the termination discussion with Melissa Nelson as well. 
Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 See IOWA CODE § 216.6(1)(a) (2009); Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 67. In order to bring a sex dis-
crimination claim in Iowa, a petitioner first timely petitions the Iowa Civil Rights Commission. Id. 
After the Commission’s approval, a petitioner may bring a sex discrimination claim against a defend-
ant. See id. If the Commission denies a petitioner’s initial claim, an appeals process is available, 
through which the petitioner must show that there is a lack of substantial evidence that a reasonable 
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employment because of her sex and that this would not have occurred had she 
been male.39 Following briefing and oral arguments, the Iowa District Court in 
Webster County granted summary judgment to Dr. Knight, reasoning that Nel-
son was fired “not because of her gender but because she was a threat to the 
marriage of Dr. Knight.”40 On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court upheld the 
summary judgment ruling, reasoning that the basis for Nelson’s termination 
was the existence of a personal relationship.41 The court explained that in the 
case of a decision based on personal relations, such as this, it is the emotions 
and feelings felt by an individual that explain the reason for termination, rather 
than the employee’s sex.42 The court further explained that Nelson’s termina-
tion was not sex discrimination under Title VII because its origin in a consen-
sual relationship made it inactionable according to federal case law.43 
The court used related but distinct case law from circuit courts to deter-
mine whether termination based on jealousy may constitute unlawful sex dis-
crimination.44 With the exception of one case, the Iowa Supreme Court primar-
ily discussed cases involving consensual physical or sexual relationships.45 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit previously held that unlawful 
sex discrimination under Title VII did not occur when an employer terminated 
an employee who had engaged in a consensual physical relationship that gen-
erated jealousy.46 Other circuits came to similar holdings based on fact patterns 
involving consensual physical relationships, reasoning that “personal animus 
. . . cannot be the basis of a discrimination claim” under federal law.47 
                                                                                                                           
person would reach the same conclusion. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n v. Woodbury Cnty. Cmty. Ac-
tion Agency, 304 N.W.2d 443, 446 (Iowa Ct. App. 1981). 
 39 Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 67. 
 40 Id. at 70. 
 41 See id. at 67, 70. 
 42 See id. at 70. 
 43 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006); Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 70; see also Benders v. Bellows & 
Bellows, 515 F.3d 757, 768 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding employee’s sex discrimination claim inactionable 
under Title VII when employer terminated employment because of desire to hide a past consensual 
relationship from his wife); Tenge v. Phillips Modern Ag Co., 446 F.3d 903, 905–06 (8th Cir. 2006) 
(finding no sex discrimination when wife’s jealousy of sexually aggressive employee prompted em-
ployee’s firing). 
 44 Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 67. 
 45 See id. at 67–68; see also Benders, 515 F.3d at 768 (involving a past consensual extramarital 
sexual affair); Tenge, 446 F.3d at 906 (involving a consensual sexual affair). The only case cited by 
the Iowa Supreme Court in Nelson that did not involve a consensual sexual affair involved nepotism 
amongst family members, which resulted in the termination of a female employee. See Nelson, 834 
N.W.2d at 67–68; Platner v. Cash & Thomas Contractors, 908 F.2d 902, 903–04 (11th Cir. 1990). 
 46 Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 67; Tenge, 446 F.3d at 905–06. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit is the circuit court for Iowa. 28 U.S.C. § 41 (2012). 
 47 Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 70 (citing Blackshear v. Interstate Brands Corp., 495 Fed. Appx. 613, 
617 (6th Cir. 2012)). These other cases had a variety of fact patterns, but most involved a consensual, 
sexual relationship. See Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 70; Benders, 515 F.3d at 768 (involving a past consen-
sual sexual affair); Tenge, 446 F.3d at 906 (involving a consensual sexual affair). 
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II. THE NELSON COURT’S LEGAL JUSTIFICATIONS 
Title VII of the United States Civil Rights Act of 1964 affords individuals 
the right to a workplace environment free from discrimination “with respect to 
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of 
such individual’s . . . sex.”48 The corresponding section of the Iowa Code simi-
larly makes it illegal to terminate employment or otherwise discriminate 
against an employee based on the employee’s sex.49 When evaluating an em-
ployee discrimination claim under the Iowa Code, the court uses standards set 
out in Title VII to guide its assessment of the claim’s validity.50 In the present 
case, after conducting a joint analysis of the two acts, which highlighted each 
act’s general statutory language and congressional intent, the Iowa Supreme 
Court decided that the facts of the case did not place the plaintiff within the 
defined class that the acts intended to protect.51 
Because § 216.6(1)(a) of the Iowa Code was modeled after Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Iowa Supreme Court used cases decided un-
der that law to guide its analysis of corresponding sex discrimination cases.52 
Despite this connection, the Iowa Supreme Court was not bound by these deci-
sions; they were merely persuasive.53 
The Nelson court began its opinion by qualifying its decision.54 First, the 
court explained, Nelson did not bring a sexual harassment claim against Dr. 
Knight and therefore the court was not required to analyze his actions within 
that framework.55 Secondly, and most pertinent for this Comment, the court 
                                                                                                                           
 48 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006). 
 49 See IOWA CODE § 216.6(1)(a) (2009). 
 50 See Nelson v. James H. Knight DDS, P.C., 834 N.W.2d 64, 67 (Iowa 2013); Deboom v. Rain-
ing Rose, Inc., 772 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Iowa 2009). 
 51 Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 76 (Cady, C.J., concurring); see id. at 70 (majority opinion). 
 52 See IOWA CODE § 216.6(1)(a); Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 67; Deboom, 772 N.W.2d at 7; Vivian v. 
Madison, 601 N.W.2d 872, 873 (Iowa 1999). 
 53 Staley v. Jones, 239 F.3d 769, 774 (6th Cir. 2001) (explaining that courts are not bound by the 
decisions of other circuit courts). 
 54 See Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 65. 
 55 Id. Sexual harassment occurs when: 
(1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condi-
tion of an individual’s employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by 
an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual, or 
(3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individu-
al’s work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working envi-
ronment. 
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (2013); see Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986) (explaining that 
the plaintiff must show that what she was subjected to was “sufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to alter 
the conditions of [her] employment and create an abusive working environment.’” (citing Henson v. 
City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982))). Because Nelson did not file such a claim, Dr. 
Knight’s actions were not analyzed under a hostile work environment rubric, and Nelson was not 
entitled to damages stemming from a hostile work environment. See Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 65. 
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explained that when an employer takes an adverse employment action against 
an individual because of a gender-specific characteristic, this may constitute 
sex discrimination.56 In light of these qualifications, however, the court main-
tained that Dr. Knight’s decision to terminate Nelson did not constitute sex 
discrimination.57 Accordingly, the Iowa Supreme Court did not disturb the dis-
trict court’s summary judgment ruling.58 
The Iowa Supreme Court justified its denial of Nelson’s sex discrimina-
tion claim by discussing several cases in which a consensual sexual relation-
ship contributed to an employee’s termination.59 The court explained that these 
cases established that an employer does not discriminate based on sex if he 
discharges a female employee who is involved in a consensual relationship that 
“has triggered personal jealousy.”60 The court primarily focused on an Eighth 
Circuit case, Tenge v. Phillips Modern Ag Co., where an employer’s wife be-
came jealous of an admitted sexual relationship between her spouse and his 
employee.61 In Tenge, the employee pinched her supervisor’s backside and 
wrote him notes of a sexual and intimate nature, inspiring jealousy in the em-
ployer’s wife.62 The Nelson court acknowledged that in its case, the existing 
consensual relationship lacked sexual intimacy.63 Nevertheless, the Iowa Su-
preme Court included the case’s narrative to introduce the novelty of Nelson’s 
claim.64 Indeed, the Tenge court seemed to anticipate the fact pattern presented 
in Nelson, as it stated, “[t]he question is not before us of whether it would be 
sex discrimination if Tenge had been terminated because [the employer’s wife] 
perceived her as a threat to her marriage but there was no evidence that she has 
engaged in any sexually suggestive conduct.”65 Nelson’s claim was just that; as 
she put it, she “did not do anything to get herself fired except exist as a fe-
male.”66 
After establishing that this was a case of first impression, the Iowa Su-
preme Court stated that it seemed odd to judge an employer’s discriminatory 
acts based on an employee’s conduct, as the court’s usual focus in a sex dis-
crimination claim is on the employer’s motivation for his actions.67 By high-
                                                                                                                           
 56 See Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 65. 
 57 See id. 
 58 See id. 
 59 See id. at 67–68. 
 60 Id. at 67. 
 61 Tenge v. Phillips Modern Ag Co., 446 F.3d 903, 910 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding the basis for 
employee’s dismissal was not her sex, but her employer’s desire to allay his wife’s concerns over their 
admitted consensual sexual behavior). 
 62 Id. at 906. 
 63 See Nelson 834 N.W.2d at 68–69; id. at 79 (Cady, C.J., concurring). 
 64 See id. at 68 (majority opinion). 
 65 Tenge, 446 F.3d at 910 n.5. 
 66 Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 69. 
 67 Id. 
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lighting its discomfort with analyzing Nelson’s claim based on her conduct 
instead of Dr. Knight’s motives, the court shifted its focus to public policy.68 
The court emphasized that Title VII and the Iowa Civil Rights Act are not gen-
eral fairness laws, and for a plaintiff to successfully allege sex discrimination, 
the employer must discriminate against the employee based upon her protected 
status, regardless of whether a discharge is unfair overall.69 The court ex-
plained that “an isolated employment decision based on personal relations” 
stems entirely from one’s feelings and emotions about a specific person.70 
These types of employment decisions are not gender-based, even if the person-
al relations would not have occurred if the employee were of a different gen-
der.71 The Iowa Supreme Court classified Nelson’s claim as such, contrasting it 
with a decision centered on gender itself.72 The court did not offer any addi-
tional clarification as to why Nelson’s claim fell into this category.73 Instead, it 
stated that the civil rights laws aim to ensure equal treatment of employees 
regardless of sex or other protected status, and that Dr. Knight’s termination of 
Melissa Nelson did not run counter to that goal, despite any apparent unfair-
ness.74 
To distinguish her claim from Tenge, Nelson submitted three main argu-
ments.75 First, she claimed that any termination stemming from an employer’s 
interest in his employee is sex discrimination because the employee’s sex “is 
implicated by the very nature of the reason for termination.”76 Second, she 
stated that Dr. Knight’s justification for her termination would enable an em-
ployer to justify an adverse employment action against a specific gender by 
using pretexts.77 Lastly, Nelson argued that if Dr. Knight would have been lia-
ble to Nelson for sexual harassment, then he should be liable for firing her out 
of fear that he was going to harass her.78 
                                                                                                                           
 68 See id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. at 70. 
 71 See id. 
 72 Id. at 70. 
 73 See id. 
 74 Id. The Iowa Supreme Court emphasized that Iowa Code § 216.6 and Title VII are not general 
fairness laws. See id. at 69. An ABA Journal article on the case poked fun at the lack of fairness: “So, 
apparently, despite the fact that you meet all of your job requirements and perform your duties respon-
sibly, you can be out on your keister because your boss can’t help making googly eyes at you.” Brian 
Sullivan, Attractive Nuisance? Lovely Lass Learns That Looks Are Litigable, A.B.A.J. 71 (Apr. 2013). 
 75 See Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 70. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. Had Nelson added a sexual harassment claim to her sex discrimination claim, she may have 
been more successful in this argument. See id. However, because of the absence of a sexual harass-
ment claim, the Iowa Supreme Court was able to avoid any analysis of Dr. Knight’s sexually-charged 
behavior, and instead focused on the difference between a decision based on personal relations and 
one based on gender alone. See id. 
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In response to her first point, the Iowa Supreme Court stated that Nelson’s 
argument was too broad and implied that it would lead to excessive litigation 
because any plaintiff whose employment was terminated following a consen-
sual relationship could argue that her plight would not have developed if she 
were of the opposite sex.79 The court reasoned that because federal case law 
holds that an adverse employment action based on a consensual workplace 
relationship cannot sustain a Title VII claim, Nelson’s claim was inactiona-
ble.80 The court responded to Nelson’s pretext argument by stating that alt-
hough a pretext may not prevail in a sex discrimination case, there was no pre-
text here because it was not disputed that Mrs. Knight actually objected to Nel-
son’s relationship with Dr. Knight.81 Lastly, the court addressed Nelson’s sexu-
al harassment argument by explaining that a successful sexual harassment 
claim must establish that the harassment created a hostile work environment.82 
Because there was no hostile work environment in Nelson’s situation, as evi-
denced by the lack of sexual harassment claim, the purpose of Title VII was 
not triggered, and Dr. Knight should thus not be exposed to the same liability 
as he would have been had sexual harassment actually occurred.83 
III. NELSON IS A MIXED-MOTIVES CASE 
The key to analyzing Nelson v. James H. Knight DDS, P.C. lies in the 
opinion’s opening lines: “Can a male employer terminate a long-time female 
employee because the employer’s wife, due to no fault of the employee, is 
concerned about the nature of the relationship between the employer and the 
employee?”84 The court explicitly stated that Nelson’s termination was “due to 
no fault of the employee,” yet left no guidance as to how the law protects an 
employee when a decision is made about her based on her attractiveness.85 At-
tractiveness is inherently tied to one’s physicality, and is a gender-specific 
                                                                                                                           
 79 Id. 
 80 See id. at 70–71. It should be noted that to support this statement, the court cited Benders v. 
Bellows & Bellows, 515 F.3d 757, 768 (7th Cir. 2008), Blackshear v. Interstate Brands Corp., 495 
Fed. Appx. 613, 617 (6th Cir. 2012), and West. v. MCI Worldcom, Inc., 205 F. Supp. 2d 531, 544–45 
(E.D. Va. 2002), each of which denied a sex discrimination claim to an employee who either had a 
consensual romantic relationship with her supervisor or had a consensual romantic relationship with 
another coworker. See Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 70–71. The court did not discuss any case in which a 
sex discrimination claim occurred absent a consensual relationship with a romantic element. See id. 
 81 Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 71. 
 82 Id. at 72; see also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 (1998); Meritor, 477 U.S. 
at 66. 
 83 Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 72. 
 84 See Nelson v. James H. Knight DDS, P.C., 834 N.W.2d 64, 65 (Iowa 2013). 
 85 See id. 
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trait.86 In deciding as it did, the court set an impossibly high threshold for a 
plaintiff to prove sex discrimination.87 Instead, a plaintiff may be terminated if 
an employer finds the employee too attractive, resulting in discrimination that 
stems from the employer’s inability to separate the employee’s gender from his 
treatment of her.88 
The problem with relying upon the federal case law that the Nelson court 
cited is that almost all of the cases exclusively involved consensual sexual re-
lationships.89 Nelson’s situation, however, involved a consensual nonsexual 
relationship that one party believed could become sexual.90 Of the six cases 
that the court discussed regarding relationships, five involved consensual sex-
ual relationships.91 The one that did not involve a sexual relationship is vastly 
different from Nelson, because it involved nepotism and family relations.92 
The court thus used sexual conduct cases to justify its decision in a case that 
lacked sexual conduct.93 Nelson was merely the victim of termination by an 
employer who panicked when his wife discovered his conduct.94 But because 
Nelson had a personal and professional relationship with her boss of ten years, 
as one may expect her to, she had no recourse when her termination oc-
curred.95 
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court found that mixed mo-
tives may support a sex discrimination case, and that in order to defeat a claim, 
an employer must show that the non-sex discrimination motive would have 
                                                                                                                           
 86 Gillen & Sherman, supra note 8, at 436–37 (finding in a psychology study that physical attrac-
tiveness is a gender-specific trait and articulating the difference between male and female attractive-
ness, thus showing gender’s impact on the traits). 
 87 See Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 70–71. 
 88 See id. at 67. 
 89 See id. at 68, 70. The court cited Tenge v. Phillips Modern Ag Co., Kahn v. Objective Solutions, 
Int’l, and Campbell v. Masten, all of which involved consensual sexual relationships. See id. at 70–71; 
Tenge v. Phillips Modern Ag Co., 446 F.3d 903, 905–06 (8th Cir. 2006); Kahn v. Objective Solutions, 
Int’l, 86 F. Supp. 2d 377, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Campbell v. Masten, 955 F. Supp. 526, 528 (D. Md. 
1997). In Tenge, the Eight Circuit held that no sex discrimination had occurred when an employer’s 
wife was jealous of an admitted sexual relationship between her husband and the terminated employ-
ee. 446 F.3d at 905–06. In Kahn, the District Court for the Southern District of New York held that 
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sufficiently supported termination on its own.96 Plainly, this means that Nelson 
would have to show that her sex was a motivating reason for her termination.97 
To meet this standard, Nelson may merely point to Dr. Knight’s fear of his own 
actions in conjunction with his appearance-based comments: when he implied 
that her clothing would cause him an erection, the statement about him getting 
it “coming and going” because of her tight pants, the instance in which he 
compared her to a Lamborghini, and multiple remarks calling her revealing 
clothing distracting.98 Each of these comments related to Nelson’s body and 
physical appearance.99 The jealousy that they inspired within Mrs. Knight is 
predicated on one of Nelson’s gender-specific characteristic: her physical ap-
pearance.100 Even if one accepts Dr. Knight’s claim that Melissa Nelson’s ter-
mination was based on his wife’s jealousy, these statements directly link the 
jealousy to her physical appearance.101 This connection provides adequate evi-
dence, tending to show that Nelson’s status as a woman was also a “motivating 
factor,” thus supporting a mixed-motives case in accordance with Price Water-
house.102 
Instead of relying upon cases involving consensual sexual relationships, 
the Nelson court should have looked to cases with similar fact patterns.103 In 
Holland v. Zarif, the plaintiff was fired because her supervisor’s wife was jeal-
ous that the two traveled on a business trip together.104 While the Delaware 
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Court of Chancery in Holland recommended that the Department of Labor act 
on the case instead of the court, it did make some suggestions on how to view 
the case.105 The Holland court stated that it was very unlikely that the supervi-
sor’s wife would have been jealous if the plaintiff had been male instead of 
female.106 “Thus,” the court explained, the plaintiff’s “firing was inspired in a 
critical way by her sex.”107 The facts in Holland are more similar to the facts in 
Nelson than to the facts in the cases that the Iowa Supreme Court cited, and, 
accordingly, the case provides meaningful insight.108 The Holland court did 
not state that gender was the sole reason for plaintiff’s termination, but that it 
was “inspired in a critical way by her sex.”109 Holland thus satisfies the Price 
Waterhouse mixed-motives analysis, just as Nelson should.110 
The decision in Nelson was met with extensive criticism and media cov-
erage.111 The backlash centered around sexism, focusing in particular on the 
all-male composition of the bench.112 It is unclear whether the public outcry 
affected its decision to do so, but the court granted Nelson’s motion for a re-
hearing, coming to the same conclusion a second time.113 
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The ramifications from this decision are detrimental for employees of any 
gender.114 Essentially, the Nelson court established precedent that allows an 
employer to fire an employee because the employer cannot control his own 
attraction, through no fault of the employee.115 This is possible because the 
Nelson court erroneously overlooked attractiveness as a gender-specific 
trait.116 Absent the gender-specific characteristic that created Mrs. Knight’s 
jealousy, Nelson would not have been perceived as a threat and would not have 
lost her job.117 With this much murkiness surrounding the case, the high stand-
ard of summary judgment was not met; Nelson’s claims were undoubtedly in-
spired by sex and should have been judged as such, whether through a trial or 
through a summary judgment in her favor.118 
CONCLUSION 
Six months of text messages, work attire choices, and a wife’s perception 
of “alleged coldness” and “alleged flirting” were offered as the basis for Dr. 
Knight’s termination of Melissa Nelson’s ten-year tenure as his dental assis-
tant. Dr. Knight’s wife felt that Nelson threatened their marriage, and, accord-
ingly, requested that her husband fire Nelson. While Mrs. Knight’s complaints 
may be valid, the threat that Mrs. Knight felt Melissa Nelson posed to her mar-
riage stemmed from Nelson’s physical attractiveness. This trait is a gender-
specific one, and, as such, falls within the spectrum of what constitutes a viola-
tion of the Iowa Civil Rights Act. 
The Iowa Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in Nelson v. James H. 
Knight DDS, P.C. set an impossibly high standard for plaintiffs to meet in sex 
discrimination cases. It rewards employers who cannot control their own sexu-
al inclinations and who decide to terminate an employee because they fear that 
they may act on those attractions. Because physical attractiveness is a gender-
specific trait, termination decisions based on attractiveness constitute sex dis-
crimination. Ignoring this fact directly counters the congressional intent of Ti-
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tle VII: to eliminate disparate treatment based on gender. In ruling that Dr. 
Knight did not commit sex discrimination through his termination of Melissa 
Nelson, the Iowa Supreme Court saved Dr. Knight from himself, at the ex-
pense of his innocent assistant. 
